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Abstract 
Background 
The importance of good health is reflected in the fact that more than half of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are aimed at improving health status. Goal 4 
(MDG4) aims to reduce child mortality. The progress indicator for goal 4 is the under-five 
mortality rate (U5M), with a targeted reduction of two thirds by 2015 from 1990 levels. This 
paper seeks to compare the time (in years) Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries will take to 
reach their MDG4 target at the current rate of decline, and the time it could have taken to 
reach their target if domestic resources had not been lost through illicit financial flows, 
corruption and servicing of debt since 2000. 
Methods 
We estimate the amount by which the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita would 
increase (in percentage terms) if losses of resource through illicit financial flows, corruption 
and debt servicing, were reduced. Using the income elasticity of U5M, a metric which reports 
the percentage change in U5M for a one percent change in GDP per capita, we estimate the 
potential gains in the annual reduction of the under-five mortality if these resource losses 
were reduced. 
Results 
At the current rate of reduction in U5M, nine countries out of this sample of 36 SSA 
countries (25%) will achieve their MDG4 target by 2015. In the absence of the leakages (IFF, 
corruption and debt service) 30 out of 36 (83%) would reach their MDG4 target by 2015 and 
all except one country, Zimbabwe would have achieved their MDG4 by 2017 (97%). In view 
of the uncertainty of the legitimacy of African debts we have also provided results where we 
excluded debt repayment from our analysis. 
Conclusions 
Most countries would have met MDG4 target by curtailing these outflows. In order to release 
latent resources in SSA for development, action will be needed both by African countries and 
internationally. We consider that stemming these outflows, and thereby reducing the need for 
aid, can be achieved with a more transparent global financial system. 
Keywords 
Illicit financial flows, Corruption, Debt, Under-five mortality, Sub Saharan Africa, 
Millennium development goals 
Background 
Improved health is not only a goal in its own right but also an ingredient for accelerated 
attainment of sustainable development [1]. The importance of good health is reflected in the 
fact that more than half of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed upon 
by world leaders in 2000 at a United Nations summit, are aimed at improving health status of 
the poor. The MDGs are a time-bound set of eight goals aimed at improving the conditions of 
living for the world’s poorest by 2015. They include 18 targets and 48 progress indicators 
that, among other things, monitor both upstream root causes of poverty and poor health, and 
the downstream health outcomes such as child mortality. 
Goal 4 (MDG4) aims to reduce child mortality. The progress indicator for MDG4 is the 
under-five mortality rate (U5M), with a targeted reduction of two thirds by 2015 from 1990 
levels. Child mortality is an indicator not only of the state of children’s health but also of the 
efficacy of a government’s social policies [2]. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) suffers the highest 
U5M with mean child mortality rate at 98 per 1000 live births in 2012 [3]. SSA has more 
than doubled its average rate of reduction of U5M from 1.5% per year in the period 1990–
2000 to about 4.0%per year for the period 2000–2012 [4]. However, this pace of progress is 
insufficient to achieve the MDGs by the target date of 2015. Indeed, using the annual rate of 
reduction for all the individual SSA countries between 2000 and 2011, it has been estimated 
that only six out of 34 SSA countries in this region will achieve their MDG4 target by 2015 
[5]. 
A major obstacle to progress on meeting the MDG targets in SSA, including MDG4, has 
been the lack of financial resources. Notwithstanding this fact, the region has been a “net 
creditor” to the rest of the world as a result of illicit financial flows (IFF) [6]. It is against this 
background of slow progress on the MDGs, amid massive leakages of resources that this 
paper intends to examine effect of loss of financial resources from SSA on the progress on 
MDG4. 
Aims 
This paper seeks to compare the time (in years) SSA countries will take to reach their MDG 4 
target at the current rate of decline and the time it could have taken to reach their target if 
domestic resources had not been lost through illicit financial flows, corruption and servicing 
of debt since 2000. 
MDG Financing gaps and lost resources: what is known? 
At the onset of the MDG period, a High-Level Panel on Financing for Development foresaw 
the shortfall in the capacity of developing countries to mobilise domestic resources required 
to meet the MDG targets and recommended that the cost of financing the MDGs be shared by 
rich and poor countries. A call was made by leaders of the UN Millennium project for a “big 
push” of increased and predictable financial support from high income countries, as poor 
countries could not reach these health and social goals because they were simply too poor [7]. 
Several estimates were made of the global annual financial gap, measuring the difference 
between the estimated total cost and the resources available from domestic sources. These 
estimates ranged widely depending on the methodology used and assumptions made, from 
around $50 billion to the highest estimate at $195 billion of overseas development aid 
required each year [8]. The overall cost of achieving MDG 4 and 5 (those related to child 
mortality and maternal health respectively) in SSA was estimated to be about $63.2 billion of 
which $27.5billion is an annual financial gap. Table 1 summarises some of these estimates. 
  
Table 1 Estimates of the cost of achieving the MDGs 
Organisation providing the estimate Annual Financing gap (USD) Scope
High-level Panel on Development (UN, 2002). 50bn All goals, all regions 
World Bank (2002). 40bn – 60bn All goals, all regions
United Nations (2005) 52bn - 73bn (in2006) and 110 - 135bn (in 2015) All goals, all regions 
Commission for Macroeconomics and Health 27bn – 38bn Goals 4,5 and 6 Health sector only, all regions 
Commission for Macroeconomics and Health 27.5bn (35.7bn can be mobilised domestically) Goals 4,5 and 6 SSA only 
UNDP (Building on Evidence : Corruption a Major Bottleneck to MDG 2012) 30bn Eradicate hunger, all regions 
18bn To provide improved water and sanitation, all regions 
 
  
As pointed out earlier, a major obstacle to funding the MDG in SSA from domestic sources 
has been lack of financial resources, yet the region has been a “net creditor” to the rest of the 
world as a result of illicit financial flows (IFF) and debt service. Authoritative analyses have 
demonstrated that IFF have driven capital out of Africa far in excess of capital inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid [6]. It has been estimated that SSA loses twice as 
much through IFF than it gains through official development assistance [9]. IFF are defined 
as funds that are illegally earned, transferred or utilised and include all unrecorded private 
financial outflows that drive the accumulation of foreign assets in contravention of applicable 
laws [10]. IFF occur through tax evasion, corruption and laundering the proceeds of criminal 
activities, the majority of which is a result of efforts to evade tax by multinational enterprises 
(MNE). It is estimated that 78 percent of all IFF from developing countries are attributable to 
trade mis-invoicing by MNE [11]. The African Development Bank estimated that Africa has 
lost $1.4 trillion from 1980 – 2009, and this outflow has been escalating since 2000 [6], 
increasing at a rate of 9 percent per year [11]. It is important to note that this estimate for IFF 
does not include resources lost due to corruption. 
Corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain [12] and remains a major 
challenge in Africa as it does in wealthy countries [13]. The available estimates of losses due 
to corruption in Africa vary, but the most widely quoted estimate is 25% of GDP per year 
(about $148 billion) by the African Union [14]. Corruption affects child health, and therefore 
child mortality, by two main channels; the impact on economic growth which will impact 
household income and the impact on the provision of public services. It has been shown that 
a unit increase in the corruption perception index leads to a loss of growth of per capita GDP 
of 0.59 percentage points [12]. The pathway by which corruption may affect the provision of 
public services results from the increase in price for these services which reduces the quantity 
and quality of services available. The effect on economic growth also reduces government 
revenue, which lowers the quality of public services which can be afforded. Poor quality 
services are a disincentive for people who can afford private services and reduces their 
willingness to pay tax, thus reducing the tax base [15]. 
Some loans to African countries have funded development but some have not. Ndikumana 
and Boyce have analysed the relationships between debts and capital flight and found that 
50% of capital loaned to African countries left those countries the same year as capital flight. 
Debts which did not benefit the population, about which they had no knowledge and in 
situations where the creditors were aware of the circumstances, are defined as odious in 
international law [16]. Since the 1970s, African public debt has piled up, as foreign loans 
were diverted into private assets abroad. In 2010, African debt stood at $300 billion with an 
annual debt service of $22 billion [17]. What is unclear is the proportion of Africa’s debt that 
can be described as odious. In view of the controversy over the legitimacy of African debts 
we provided estimates which include the servicing of debt and estimates where debt service is 
not included. 
Lost Resources and Child Mortality: the Pathways 
There are two primary channels through which lost resources will translate into slower 
progress in reducing child mortality: reduced income and lower public provision of services. 
In the reduced income channel, resource flight represents lost opportunities for investment 
and income-generation. A country therefore realises lower GDP per capita, which means that 
on average, households will command fewer resources. A negative income-child mortality 
association has been firmly established. The landmark paper ‘Wealthier is Healthier’ showed 
using instrumental variables that the relationship between income and health is not only 
associative but causative and suggested that increased income improves health by 
expenditure on goods which improve health or the socioeconomic determinants of health 
[18]. The importance of income has been confirmed by many others and summarised in a 
systematic review [19]. In the present case this lower income, due to resource outflows, 
translates to a slower reduction of child mortality. 
In the public service provision channel, the lost resources represent lost government 
revenues. IFF reduces the tax revenue as they involve tax evasion. Debt service and some 
forms of corruption compete for the same resources as public provision of social services. 
Therefore, the available resource envelope at the disposal of a government is reduced and the 
proportion spent on providing social services is also reduced. 
The pathways through which GDP may affect child mortality (reduced household income and 
lower public provision of services), and thus time to reach the MDG4, is represented 
schematically in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Relationship between resources and U5M. Adapted from [5] with permission. 
The relative importance of these two channels has not been established and it is likely that the 
balance varies between countries and between different aspects of child welfare. For 
example, when looking at childhood deprivation in 68 low and middle income countries, 
GDP per capita was found to be more important than quality of governance for shelter, 
sanitation and education. However, quality of governance was more important than GDP per 
capita for provision of safe water, malnutrition prevention and healthcare [20]. There are also 
different aspects of governance: it has been asserted that “the rule of law influences child 
mortality more than the size of the government’s coffers” [21] and some governments have 
been considered to be better than others at converting resources into human development 
[22]. In the absence of state capacity to provide public goods such as water and sanitation, 
families have to provide these and will be in a better position to do so if their household 
income allows. It is therefore likely that in countries with low state capacity the direct impact 
on household income predominates over the impact of the state on service provision and that 
corruption through its impact on economic growth [12] has an impact on child mortality 
predominantly via household income rather than via the services provision pathway. 
Methods 
We estimate the amount by which the current GDP per capita would increase (in percentage 
terms) if losses of resource through illicit financial flows, corruption and debt servicing, were 
reduced. To compute these gains in GDP per capita, we rely on previous work by Global 
Financial Integrity (GFI) [23] where IFF lost were expressed as a percentage of GDP. These 
IFF/GDP ratios can also be interpreted as per capita ratios. We take the approach that these 
IFF/GDP ratios figures represent the amount by which GDP per capita in the country of 
origin would have increased if the resources had not leaked out. However, it is probable that 
the GDP would have risen to a greater extent than this estimate given the investment-
multiplier effects. Therefore, the estimates presented here are conservative. 
Ugur and Dasgupta synthesised 115 studies on the effect of corruption on economic growth. 
In this meta-analysis, they found that a unit increase in the corruption perception index leads 
to a loss of growth of per capita GDP of 0.59 percentage points [12]. We use this estimate to 
calculate the potential growth of per capita GDP achievable in the absence of any perception 
of corruption using Transparency International’s index. The Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranges from 0 (the most corrupt) to 10 (the least corrupt) 
[24]. A majority of African countries have a CPI of less than four. We have estimated the 
potential economic growth that would have been attained if each of these countries had 
maintained a CPI of 10 since the year 2000. 
We assume that the allocation of government resources does not change and that each sector 
including the health sector continues to receive the same proportion of funding with the 
increased availability of resources as corruption and IFF are reduced. This assumption is 
reasonable given the evidence that reduced corruption, will lead to economic growth [12] and 
improved governance results in increased spending on, and provision of, social services 
include health care services [15]. 
For figures on debt service, we use data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators series. We then sum the losses of resource through IFF, corruption and debt service 
to get the overall annual loss of resources (as a percentage of GDP per capita). 
Next, we estimate the potential gains in the annual reduction of the under-five mortality. In 
order to do this we multiply the percentage by which the GDP per capita would increase, by 
the income elasticity of U5M, a metric which reports the percentage change in U5M for a one 
percent change in GDP per capita. The pooled estimate for SSA, derived after systematic 
review and meta-analysis, is 0.38 [19]. 
To derive the number of years it would take to reach MDG 4 under two scenarios, with and 
without resource leakages, we use the following formula: 
(1 )nF P r= −  (1) 
Where F is the future (or desired) under-five mortality rate, P is the actual (2000) under-five 
mortality rate, r is the rate of decline in under-five mortality rate and n is the number of years 
Solving for n in (1), we have: 
ln( / )
ln(1 )
F Pn
r
= −  (2) 
We calculate actual n (in the presence of resource leakages) using the actual rates of 
reduction [4], as r. To compute n in the absence of resource leakages, we proceed as follows: 
losses to IFF and debt service are treated as realisable increases in GDP per capita if these 
losses did not occur. For corruption, we assume absence of corruption by taking a score of 10 
on Transparency International’s index, i.e. it is perceived that there is no corruption. We then 
calculate the annual increase in per capita GDP by taking the difference between each 
country’s CPI score and 10 and then taking the multiplying this difference with 0.59 from the 
meta-analysis cited above. We then aggregate the potential increase in GDP per capita from 
curtailing these resource outflows. The potential increase in rate of reduction of U5M is 
calculated by taking the product of increase in GDP per capita and the income-child mortality 
elasticity of 0.38. The GDP per capita/under five-mortality elasticity is based on the increase 
in economic growth which comes when there is no perceived corruption and our model 
assumes that each sector including the health sector continues to receive the same proportion 
of funding with the increased availability of resources as corruption and IFF are reduced. 
Results 
Country level estimates for gains in U5M decline 
We have provided estimates on 36 countries out of a total of 48 in the region because for 
some countries no estimate of their IFF was available. We have estimated the year when the 
MDG for each country will be reached at the current rate of decline using the most recent 
estimates (2000–2012) and we have estimated the year that countries will reach their MDG 
target if domestic resources had been fully mobilised or losses of resources through illicit 
financial flows, corruption and debt servicing, were curtailed. 
As Table 2 shows, at the current rate of reduction in U5M, nine countries out of this sample 
of 36 SSA countries (25%) will achieve their MDG4 by 2015 (column 11). In the absence of 
the leakages (IFF, corruption and debt service) 30 out of 36 (83%) would reach their MDG 
by 2015 and all except one country (Zimbabwe) would have achieved their MDG by 2017 
(column 13). In view of the uncertainty of the legitimacy of African debts we have excluded 
debt repayment from one of our analysis (column 12). However we note that this has little 
influence on our findings in terms of years to reach the MDG. 
  
Table 2 The impact of curtailing the leakage of resources on time to reach MDG4 in SSA 
Country 2000 actual 
mortality rates 
(2014 report) 
MDG 
Goals 
actual rates 
of reduction 
(%) 
non-normalised 
IFF (%of GDP) 
corruption 
Perception 
Index 
(Transparency 
International) 
percentage 
of GDP lost 
corruption 
potential 
rates of 
reduction 
(IFF and 
Corruption) 
debt service 
(% of GDP) 
potential 
rates of 
reduction 
(IFF, 
Corruption  
nd debt service)
number of 
years to 
reach MDG4 
(at actual rates) 
number of 
years to 
reach MDG4 
(potential 
rates-IFF and 
ORPN)
number of years 
to reach MDG4 
(potential rates- IFF, 
COPRN and debt) 
Angola 203 87 1.8 7 1.9 4.8 6.28 11.4 10.61 47 13 8 
Benin 174 61 4.2 1 2.9 4.2 6.17 1.2 6.63 24 16 15 
Botswana 85 17 3.9 10 5.7 2.5 8.66 0.7 8.93 40 18 17 
Burkina Faso 186 67 5.0 3 3.4 3.9 7.62 1 8.00 20 13 12 
Burundi 150 63 3.0 6 1.8 4.8 7.12 2.5 8.07 28 12 10 
Cameroon 150 50 3.8 6 2.4 4.5 7.78 3 8.92 28 14 12 
Central African Republic 164 59 2.0 5 2.0 4.7 5.69 1.5 6.26 51 17 16 
Chad 189 67 1.9 20 1.6 5.0 11.38 1.7 12.03 54 9 8 
Congo, DR 171 66 1.3 3 2.0 4.7 4.23 4.7 6.02 73 22 15 
Congo, Rep 118 35 1.7 25 1.9 4.8 13.02 2.5 13.97 71 9 8 
Cote d’Ivoire 145 51 2.5 6 2.1 4.7 6.55 4.4 8.22 41 15 12 
Ethiopia 146 70 6.3 6 2.7 4.3 10.22 1 10.60 11 7 7 
Gabon 86 31 2.7 11 2.9 4.2 8.47 7.2 11.21 37 12 9 
Gambia 116 55 3.9 14 2.7 4.3 10.86 3.5 12.19 19 6 6 
Ghana 103 39 3.0 2 4.0 3.5 5.11 3 6.25 32 19 15 
Guinea 171 76 4.4 9 1.8 4.8 9.66 4.1 11.22 18 8 7 
Guinea Bissau 174 80 2.5 7 2.0 4.7 6.95 1.7 7.60 31 11 10 
Kenya 110 35 3.4 1 2.1 4.7 5.55 2.5 6.50 33 20 17 
Lesotho 114 34 1.1 15 3.3 4.0 8.30 3.7 9.71 109 14 12 
Madagascar 109 56 5.2 6 2.8 4.2 9.09 1.2 9.55 12 7 7 
Malawi 174 75 7.5 10 3.2 4.0 12.82 1.7 13.47 11 6 6 
Mali 220 83 4.5 3 2.9 4.2 7.23 1.8 7.92 21 13 12 
Mauritania 111 43 2.3 12 2.5 4.4 8.54 3.5 9.87 41 11 9 
Mozambique 166 83 5.1 5 2.6 4.4 8.66 1.3 9.15 13 8 7 
Niger 227 102 5.8 3 2.8 4.2 8.55 1.3 9.05 13 9 8 
Nigeria 188 77 3.5 12 2.5 4.4 9.74 2.8 10.81 25 9 8 
Rwanda 182 58 10.0 5 3.4 3.9 13.38 0.9 13.72 11 8 8 
Senegal 139 50 7.1 1 3.1 4.1 9.03 3 10.17 14 11 10 
South Africa 74 19 4.2 4 4.7 3.1 6.91 2.4 7.82 32 19 17 
Sudan 106 41 3.1 3 1.5 5.0 6.15 1.3 6.64 30 15 14 
Swaziland 121 28 3.4 11 3.5 3.8 9.04 1.5 9.61 42 15 14 
Tanzania 132 52 7.4 2 2.8 4.2 9.77 0.9 10.12 12 9 9 
Togo 122 50 2.0 6 2.6 4.4 5.94 1.8 6.62 44 15 13 
Uganda 147 62 6.3 3 2.5 4.4 9.12 1 9.50 13 9 9 
Zambia 169 57 5.4 9 2.9 4.2 10.41 4.4 12.08 20 10 8 
Zimbabwe 102 26 1.1  2.1 4.7 2.87 3.7 4.28 124 47 31 
Total 146 56 4.0   5.9 6.19  6.19 24 15 15 
Discussion 
Principal findings 
The leakage of resources out of SSA has greatly impeded progress in meeting MGD4. These 
findings are consistent with our previous projections, that only six countries out of 34 in SSA 
will achieve the MDG4 targets by 2015, against sixteen which would do so in the absence of 
IFF [5]. The estimate has increased from six out of 34 to nine countries out of 36 reaching 
their MDG4 by 2015 because we use more recent estimates which suggest a slightly faster 
current rate of decline. This paper adds to these previous findings by considering progress 
that would have been attainable in the absence of corruption and the burden of debt service, 
in addition to IFF. The results add further weight to the widely accepted argument that 
corruption and tax evasion have a negative impact on economic development because they 
divert public resources for private use and erode the government’s tax base, ultimately 
impeding efforts to reduce poverty [25]. The present findings provide evidence of the impact 
of these mechanisms using the specific example of child mortality. There is little precedent in 
the literature of the effects of IFF and corruption on health outcomes in terms of number of 
years to reach MDG4 targets. A limitation of this analysis is that we were able to include only 
36 countries owing to data constraints. Further, perceptions of corruption are not entirely 
objective and therefore our results are not conclusive but nonetheless indicative of likely 
impacts. 
IFF 
Domestically mobilised resources including taxation are generally recognised as the most 
predictable source of finance for governments and since the financial crisis of 2008, this has 
become a priority for financing the MDGs [26]. Average tax revenues as a proportion of GDP 
are generally low in low-income countries; half of the countries in SSA collect less than 17% 
of their GDP in tax as compared to high income countries where the average is 35% [27]. 
SSA loses up to half of its potential corporate income tax revenue, which is a major 
component of total government revenue in low income countries, as a result of IFF [28]. It is 
therefore not surprising that previous research on IFF and child mortality have shown a 
negative association, a message similar to that presented in this paper. For example Christian 
Aid [29] estimated tax losses due IFF may be responsible for 5.6 million child deaths 
between 2000 and 2015. Similar results have been obtained by Save the Children [30] which 
estimates that if developing countries were to reduce IFF more child deaths could be avoided 
each year and all preventable child deaths could be avoided twenty years ahead of current 
predictions, which are presently at 2050. The OECD has called for policy coherence for 
development with respect to IFF and the role OECD countries play in facilitating these [31]. 
Corruption 
In 2004 the World Bank estimated that countries which tackle corruption can increase their 
per capita incomes by 400% [32]. The allocation of government contracts through a corrupt 
system will result in poor quality infrastructure and services, including health and education 
[33], which will impact child welfare and therefore mortality. Kauffman and colleagues 
found a strong causal effect between improved governance and better developmental 
outcomes. They examined 300 measures of governance and found strong agreement across 
the many different indexes of the quality of governance. They found that a standard deviation 
increase in any of their six measures of governance was associated with a 2.5 fold increase in 
per capita GDP, a fourfold decrease in infant mortality and a 15-25% increase in literacy 
[34]. Gupta and colleague find that child mortality is one third higher in corrupt versus less 
corrupt countries, infant mortality and low birth weight is twice as high and school drop put 
is five times higher in corrupt countries. They find that the effect of social spending on health 
and education is largely insignificant except that public education spending may reduce the 
dropout rates in less corrupt countries. They find that income elasticity of child mortality in 
countries with low corruption is twice as high as countries with high corruption, which 
suggests that income is more effective at improving social indicators in countries with low 
corruption [15]. Recent work confirms that social spending has more impact in well governed 
countries [35]. In this work we used the per capita GDP channel to quantify the impact of 
corruption on child mortality and the present findings confirm and further quantitate the 
extent of negative health effects of corruption in terms of lost years to achieve MDG4. It is 
likely that the impact is via the household income, and therefore would not be influenced by 
decisions with regards to the allocation of resources; nonetheless our model assumes that 
each sector including the health sector continues to receive the same proportion of the 
increased funding available. 
Debt 
Discriminating between odious and legitimate debts requires auditing. African countries are 
likely to benefit from debt audits and repudiation of odious debts but leaders who have 
benefited personally from irresponsible borrowing are unlikely to initiate such audits. Given 
that half of African loans left in the form of capital flight it is likely that at a minimum 50% 
of African debt is odious but this requires auditing and repudiation at national level [16] 
Conclusions 
Given the massive drainage of resources through IFF, the findings that SSA would have 
achieved more in reducing child mortality and most countries would have met MDG4 target 
by curtailing these outflows are unsurprising. In order to achieve such curtailment, action will 
be needed both by individual African countries and internationally mainly in OECD 
countries. We consider that IFF can be stopped by poor and rich countries working together 
to create a more transparent global financial regime that limits financial secrecy and legislates 
for companies to report profits according to the country in which they were made. 
Corruption is another important way in which resources are lost. Corruption stagnates 
economic growth [36] and will impact child survival via the effect on household income and 
on the efficacy of social spending. Measures that have been shown to reduce corruption 
should be taken, including decentralisation of budgets, community participation and 
transparency in contracts [37]. Western countries and multinational enterprises can facilitate 
this effort by publishing in an accessible format their overseas development aid, contracts 
agreed to and country by country reporting of profits. African countries should audit their 
debt to determine legitimacy; they could be greatly helped in this endeavour by their 
development partners who could take the initiative to audit their debts. 
Regardless of how good plans for the post 2015 development agenda may be, SSA is likely to 
continue to lag behind and miss proposed targets if the plans do not incorporate serious 
mechanisms of curtailing IFF, corruption and servicing of illegitimate debt. It is imperative 
that domestic resource mobilisation be strengthened to improve the progress on reducing 
child mortality and the achievement of other development goals. 
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